On 18 August, a group of gunmen carried out an attack near Eilat, an Israeli resort city on the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. First, the assailants opened fire on a bus heading from Beersheba to Eilat and then on two private vehicles in the vicinity. By the end of the incident, six Israelis and seven of the attackers had been killed. Israeli authorities blamed Palestinian elements in Gaza for the crime and the Israeli media lashed out at Egypt for its alleged loss of control over the security situation in the Sinai. They claimed that the attackers had infiltrated from Gaza into the Sinai and from there into Israeli territory. Some went so far as to accuse Egypt of being complicit in the crime.
Then, several hours later, five Egyptian border patrolmen were killed by Israeli forces that were chasing the gunmen that were fleeing in the direction of the Egyptian territory. According to the report of UN forces in the area, the Israeli forces committed two violations: they entered Egyptian territory and they fired on Egyptian soldiers.
Suddenly, the tables were turned. Whereas before this, Israel had pointed its finger at Egypt for laxness in its control on the border and the security situation in the Sinai -- accusations spiced up with stories of radical Islamists taking over portions of the peninsula and backed by a US State Department statement in support of Israel -- now, Egypt is waging a counteroffensive, accusing Israel of breaching its borders and killing several of its military personnel.
Tensions rapidly escalated between the two countries. Egyptian officials have come under immense popular pressure to exact revenge, with demands ranging from recalling the Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv and the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Cairo to cutting off gas exports to Israel and terminating the Camp David Accords. Potential presidential candidates have been quick to take advantage of the situation, rivalling each other in their posturing and their lists of demands, which they know the Egyptian government cannot meet and which they would never venture to act on themselves, if they were actually in the president's office. But the game of political one-upmanship must go on.
In an attempt to respond to some of the demands, the "temporary" Egyptian government announced that it would recall the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv. It would have been a logical step that might have assuaged an angry public. However, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) felt that such a move would be excessive at the outset of the crisis and should only be considered in the context of a tit-for-tat escalation. SCAF also believed that, in addition to being premature, taking such a step at this juncture would severely hamper future elected governments that would be unable to retract a "popular" decision. In addition, the US administration would regard such a step as a totally unwarranted escalation, all the more so now that Israel has halted its media campaign and Tel Aviv has responded to some demands. Both Minister of Defence Ehud Barak and President Shimon Peres have issued official apologies and the Israeli government has also agreed to the demand for a joint investigation, which are reactions unprecedented in the history of bumpy relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
However, to the new political forces and parties, the angry crowds surrounding the Israeli embassy in Cairo presented too good an opportunity to pass up and they raced to outbid one another in proclamations and declarations intended to win the approval of people who hear only what they want to hear. For the Islamists, in particular, the moment was particularly fortuitous. Their bid to play to the gallery and push to escalate the situation was motivated by two considerations, at least. Firstly, they hope to cover up the crime that occurred in Arish on Friday, 29 July, when a gang of gunmen bearing black banners (indicating their affiliation with Al-Qaeda) attacked a police department in that northern Sinai city, killing an army officer and a policeman. Egyptian security officials have confirmed that Palestinians belonging to militant Islamist organisations based in Gaza and subordinate to Hamas took part in the attack. Secondly, the crisis has presented them with an opportunity to respond to Egyptian Chief-of- Staff Sami Anan who recently said that the civil nature of the Egyptian state is a question of national security. The Islamists reject out of hand the notion of a set of principles that would govern the drafting of the new constitution and guarantee the civil nature of the Egyptian state. They are, therefore, bent on capitalising on the current situation in order to inflame public opinion, up the threshold of popular demands, and push SCAF into a corner whereby its only recourse will be to strike a separate deal with the Islamists in accordance with which it will back down on its commitment to a civil state and a set of governing principles for the constitution.
In spite of such pressures, both the Egyptian and Israeli governments have been realistic in their management of the crisis. The Egyptian government is clearly determined to adopt an approach that is markedly different from the way the Mubarak regime used to handle such border incidents before, claiming the lives of at least 23 Egyptian soldiers. It therefore was adamant in its demands for an official Israeli apology, a joint investigation and guarantees that such assaults would not happen again. However, it refrained from taking any escalatory steps that might cause the situation to spiral out of control, which is why Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi rejected the prime minister's decision to recall the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv at this stage. At the same time, Egyptian authorities gave public opinion full freedom to vent its anger, not even intervening to prevent the removal of the Israel flag from the Israeli embassy in Cairo in spite of the adverse diplomatic consequences this could have had. In addition, SCAF took advantage of the incident to compel Israel to revise the peace agreement articles pertaining to the deployment and armament levels of Egyptian forces in the Sinai and in Area C in particular.
It was equally clear that the Israeli government took pains to handle the crisis in a different way than had been its custom. Not only has it stopped accusing Egypt of losing control over security in the Sinai, it has shown its appreciation for SCAF's refusal to act on the Egyptian government's decision to recall the Egyptian ambassador by sending two high- level envoys to Egypt in order to alleviate the crisis. Also, not only have both the Israeli minister of defence and the president issued formal apologies and agreed to a joint investigation, they have also kept the door open to a possible renegotiation of the terms regarding the deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai.
Both sides, therefore, have acted in responsible ways in order to cap the crisis. The Egyptian side, moreover, will take advantage of the forthcoming period to follow through on its demand to renegotiate over Egyptian troop and armaments levels in Area C, a corridor that extends 220 kilometres along the border with Israel and another 14 kilometres along the border with Gaza. If Israel complains that Egyptian security in this area is weak and insufficient to prevent cross-border infiltrations, then Egypt can only agree. It is as much in Egypt's interests as it is in Israel's to tighten security on its side of the border. Egypt, too, has suffered the consequences of border infiltrations, to which the attack on the police station in Arish is the latest tragic testimony.
Israel should comply with the Egyptian demand to increase its military and security presence in this area to levels that would enable Egypt to assert its full control over the border area that, ultimately, will serve the interests of both sides. Certainly, a favourable Israeli response on this question will go a long way to putting the current crisis behind us. Conversely, Israeli obstinacy and evasion tactics will only exacerbate the situation. It is time for Israel to wake up to the fact that it can no longer hamper Egypt's ability to control its borders and then blame Cairo if anything goes wrong. That old game was up the moment that the Mubarak regime fell.
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